SCKit malware exploits ScreenConnect to target technician sessions and deploy unauthorized remote access tools

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On November 11, 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence confirmed an active campaign exploiting the ConnectWise ScreenConnect application, targeting managed service providers (MSPs). This campaign involves the deployment of a malicious worm, SCKit, which leverages unauthorized access to install remote-access clients on customer endpoints. The implications of this attack are significant, as it allows threat actors to gain control over technician workstations and distribute further malicious payloads.

Microsoft’s analysis reveals that the SCKit worm operates by issuing commands through ScreenConnect to install a client that connects to threat actor-controlled infrastructure. This process begins with a batch launcher that retrieves a PowerShell decoder, which decrypts and extracts SCKit using device-specific key material. The worm establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry entries, enabling it to deliver malicious payloads to technicians connecting to compromised endpoints.

Understanding ScreenConnect’s Architecture

ScreenConnect, now known as ConnectWise Control, is a remote-support platform widely used by MSPs for device administration. Its architecture consists of three main components:

  • Management Instance: This is a cloud-hosted or on-premises server that manages sessions and facilitates communication between technicians and endpoint clients.
  • Technician Workstation: Support staff access the console via a browser and launch a local client for interactive support.
  • Customer Endpoint: An installed client maintains unattended access and executes commands delivered through ScreenConnect.

ScreenConnect supports both persistent access sessions and temporary support sessions, allowing technicians to execute commands directly on customer devices without intermediary involvement.

Attack Vectors and Exploitation

The exploitation of ScreenConnect involves multiple attack vectors. One reported method is through server-side entry via extensions, which are add-ons that enhance ScreenConnect’s functionality. A flaw in the RMM+ extension allowed unauthorized access when no access key was configured, enabling attackers to submit commands to the server’s API without proper authentication.

In addition to server-side vulnerabilities, SCKit employs a client-side attack path. The worm’s RelayTrap component is designed to deliver payloads to technician workstations when they connect for support. This dual approach—leveraging both server-side and client-side vulnerabilities—illustrates the complexity and sophistication of the attack.

Detailed Attack Chain

The attack chain initiated by SCKit involves several stages:

  1. Installation of an Additional Client: The threat actor uses the MSP’s ScreenConnect management instance to direct the endpoint client to download and install a malicious client from an attacker-controlled server.
  2. PowerShell Decoder Retrieval: A batch launcher retrieves a PowerShell decoder that decrypts and extracts the SCKit bundle.
  3. Bundle Extraction: The decoder uses machine-specific identifiers to derive decryption keys, allowing it to extract the toolkit components.
  4. RelayTrap Deployment: RelayTrap establishes persistence on the customer endpoint and targets technician workstations during support sessions.

This multi-faceted approach not only compromises the initial endpoint but also extends the attack to technician workstations, significantly increasing the potential impact of the malware.

Mitigation Strategies

Organizations using ScreenConnect should implement several mitigation strategies to protect against SCKit and similar threats:

  • Secure Administration: Ensure that server-side extension APIs are properly authenticated and that technician clients are updated to the latest versions, which include fixes for known vulnerabilities.
  • Investigate Affected Endpoints: Use out-of-band methods to investigate suspected devices, preserving evidence and revoking exposed sessions from clean devices.
  • Remove Unauthorized Clients: Validate and remove any unauthorized clients and associated persistence mechanisms from affected endpoints.
  • Maintain Antivirus Protections: Keep Microsoft Defender Antivirus and other security measures enabled to detect and respond to potential threats.

By understanding the attack vectors and implementing robust security measures, organizations can better defend against the evolving threat landscape represented by SCKit and similar malware.

For further insights into this threat and protective measures, refer to the Microsoft Security Blog.

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